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Introduction
1 The World Economic Outlook (WEO) is a survey by the IMF published twice a year (in
April and October) and partly updated in January and July. The analysis and projections
contained  in  the  WEO,  the  IMF’s  flagship  report,  are  integral  parts  of  the  IMF’s
surveillance  of  economic  developments  and  policies  in  its  member  countries,  of
developments in international financial markets, and of the global economic system. 
2 The four  editions  are  coordinated  by  the  Economic  Counsellor  and Director  of  the
Research Department, a position currently held by economist Gita Gopinath, the first
woman  to  hold  that  position.  The  survey  of  prospects  and  policies  stems  from  a
comprehensive  interdepartmental  review  of  world  economic  developments,  which
draws primarily on information the IMF staff gathers through its consultations with
member  countries.  These  consultations  are  notably  carried  out  by  the  IMF’s  area
departments—namely, the African Department, Asia and Pacific Department, European
Department,  Middle  East  and  Central  Asia  Department,  and  Western  Hemisphere
Department—together with the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department; the Monetary
and Capital Markets Department; and the Fiscal Affairs Department. Although the final
edition of the WEO benefits from comments and suggestions by Executive Directors, the
views expressed therein are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the
views of the IMF’s Executive Directors or their national authorities.
3 The two main editions have the same structure. The first chapter presents the IMF’s
outlook for the world economy in the short- and mid-term context, with projections
out to four years. WEO forecasts include key macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP, 
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inflation, current account and fiscal balance for more than 180 countries around the
globe. The other three chapters are called ‘analytical chapters’;  these address major
economic policy issues, in general related to the challenges facing the international
economy and the policy recommendations to deal with them. 
4 Yet, the analysis and prescriptions presented in the WEO are not necessarily translated
into policy conditionalities imposed by the IMF in its rescue packages. As Prates and
Farhi  (2015)  stress,  this  disconnection  has  become  even  greater  since  the  global
financial crisis (GFC), which had significant consequences for the IMF´s macroeconomic
theory and policy guidelines (Gallagher & Ban, 2014).
5 In face of the failure of orthodox economics to provide a set of tools to avert the GFC, as
well as to deal with the policy dilemmas in the post-crisis setting, the IMF’s analytical
and  normative  framework  has  encompassed  issues  that  have  been  stressed  by
heterodox economists for a long time. Usually, those issues have already been taken
over by unorthodox scholars of mainstream economics.1 
6 Chronologically,  the  first  one  was  the  IMF’s  recognition  of  the  need  of  including
macroprudential  aims  in  macroeconomic  policies  (Blanchard  &  Dell’Ariccia,  2010;
Blanchard, 2011). The second, third and fourth changes, respectively, were the more
favourable  view  on  capital  controls  (IMF,  2011  and  2012),2 the  recognition  of  the
negative effects of fiscal austerity in times of crisis (Blanchard & Leigh, 2013), and the
interconnectedness  of  global  banks  and  the  systemic  risks  posed  by  securitization
(Basurto et al., 2015). The fifth one was the acknowledgement that instead of delivering
economic  growth,  some  neoliberal  policies  have  increased  inequality,  jeopardizing
sustained expansion (Ostry, Loungani & Fourcery, 2016).3 It is also worth mentioning
that the WEO of October 2019 stressed that the decline in long-term interest rates to
historically  very  low or  negative  levels  in  advanced economies,  while  reducing the
likely impact of further monetary policy easing, expands fiscal leeway. In this context,
the  IMF  recommends  that  ‘in  countries  where  activity  has  weakened  or  could
decelerate sharply, fiscal stimulus can be provided if fiscal space exists and fiscal policy
is not already overly expansionary […], especially where room to ease monetary policy
is limited’ (IMF, 2019, p. 24).
7 These critical analyses have been made through different types of documents or, as
Longuet and Marques Pereira (2015) propose, different linguistic forms, such as staff
discussion  notes,  policy  papers,  flagship  reports4 and  papers  published  in  the  IMF
economic journal (Finance & Development). The media impact and the potential audience
for the IMF’s new discourse is not independent of the type of linguistic form used. For
instance,  while  a  staff  discussion  note  expresses  the  opinion  of  staff  members,  a
flagships report (such as the WEO) conveys the IMF’s official position. 
8 In  the  next  section,  we  present  a  critical  review  of  the  World  Economic  Outlook
launched in April 2018. After summarizing the global outlook depicted in chapter 1, we
focus  on the  three  analytical  chapters  that  dig  into  the  determinants  of  long-term
economic growth. Chapters 2 and 4 address two key issues for orthodox growth theory:
labour  force  participation  in  advanced  economies,  and  innovative  activity  and
technological knowhow. Chapter 3, in turn, deals with a crucial issue to the heterodox
approach  to  economic  growth,  i.e.,  the  role  of  manufacturing  in  the  dynamics  of
productivity, employment and income distribution. Yet, the chapter concludes that, as
services  can  offer  considerable  scope  for  productivity  gains,  contributing  to  the
convergence of income per worker across countries, the best policy response is not to
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overrule market forces and subsidize manufacturing. Another policy prescription of
the analytical chapters is trade liberalization. Hence, once more, the IMF embraced the
heterodox perspective only partially. As the WEO is a flagship report, this was more
than expected.
 
1. Beyond orthodoxy, but falling short of heterodoxy
9 Chapter 1 of the WEO published in April 2018 depicts a positive short-term scenario,
estimating global growth of 3.9 percent in 2018 and 2019. Then, the global economic
recovery that began around mid-2016 has become broader and stronger, besides being
above previous expectations.  Faster growth in the euro area, Japan, and the United
States (US) drove this output acceleration. All three of these economies grew above the
expectations  for  2017,  along with some recovery in  commodity  exporters.  The IMF
revised upward the growth rates of several other emerging markets and developing
economies in 2018, such as Mexico and emerging Europe.
10 Growing trade and investment continued as crucial factors driving the global upswing.
A broad base  and faster  economic  growth had not  been seen since 2010,  when the
global economy recovered from the financial crisis. If the IMF staff’s projections are
confirmed, the three-year period 2017-2019 would record the largest and most stable
expansion after such a crisis, but would still be lower than that observed in the pre-
crisis boom. The synchronized expansion would help settle the remaining legacies of
the crisis  by accelerating the end of  unconventional monetary policies in advanced
economies, fostering investment, and improving labour markets.
11 As usual, chapter 1 also outlines the risks to the forecast. Although these are balanced
over  the  next  several  quarters,  over  the  medium and  long  term,  the  likelihood  of
negative shifts in the forecast rises. Two main risks are identified. The first risk refers
to the possibility of monetary policy tightening sooner than expected in the US where
demand is buoyant,  stimulated by a more expansive fiscal policy.  Accordingly,  such
tightening  would  have  negative  effects  on  highly  indebted  countries,  firms,  and
households. However, the IMF does not explain why that contagion effect would take
place. 
12 The spillover of the monetary conditions in the US to other countries happens because
the US dollar is the key currency, with its policy rate being the main interest rate of the
current international monetary and financial system. It is worth noting that the crucial
role  of  US  monetary  policy  in  shaping  international  financial  conditions  since  the
emergence of financial globalization, for a long time stressed by heterodox scholars,
has already been recognized in mainstream economics (e.g., Rey, 2015) as well as by
various IMF publications on the role of capital controls after the GFC (e.g., IMF, 2011a
and 2011b).
13 The second risk concerns the increasing measures of trade restrictions and retaliation
that could result in a trade war. Such a risk could intensify if the US trade deficit were
to rise in a context of expansionist fiscal policy and no action in Europe and Asia to
scale  back  surpluses.  The  renewed  popularity  of  nationalistic  policies,  another
collateral effect of the global financial crisis (GFC), has also fostered these measures.
Pessimistic prospects for household income growth in advanced economies, coupled
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with  trends  of  higher  polarization  in  jobs  and  incomes,  are  also  underlying  such
protectionist trend. 
14 The IMF alerts  that a  trade war could jeopardize the multilateral  rules-based trade
system that took shape after World War II and that underpinned the unprecedented
growth in the world economy. Hence, in this WEO (2018), the IMF explicitly supports
trade  liberalization,  a  key  precondition  for  productive  globalization,  stressing  its
overall benefits for all groups of countries (advanced, emerging and developing, and
low-income). Conversely, no explicit criticism of financial globalization, underlying the
aforementioned  contagion  effect  of  US  monetary  policy,  is  presented.  Finally,  the
chapter  stresses  that,  if  policymakers  do  not  address  the  challenges  for  long-term
growth,  political  risks could intensify,  possibly reversing some of  the progress that
economic reforms and integration have achieved to date. 
15 In  face  of  such  challenges,  the  analytical  chapters  (i.e.,  chapters  2,  3  and  4)  focus
precisely on the key determinants of long-term economic growth. These three chapters
provide updated and interesting data, but there are important differences among them.
16 Chapters 2  and  4  address  two  key  issues  for  orthodox  (i.e.,  neoclassical)  growth
theories:5 labour force participation in advanced economies,  and innovative activity
and  technological  knowhow,  respectively.  The  conclusions  and  policy
recommendations are also coherent with such theories. 
17 Chapter 2 stresses that ‘the availability of factors of production, including labor, is an
important  determinant  of  actual  and  potential  growth  in  the  long  term.  The
participation rate, together with population growth, is the key determinant of labor
supply’.  Hence,  population  aging  and,  for  many  countries,  declining  overall
participation rates could harm growth in advanced countries. It also argues that the
widespread decline in participation of young and prime-age men is worrisome. The
chapter recommends a set of policies to curb these effects, such as: tax policies (e.g.,
reforming the tax-benefit system by reducing the labour tax wedge) and educational
investments (e.g., strengthening policies that improve the job-matching process that
can encourage individuals  to  keep working or  to  seek employment).  Moreover,  the
chapter criticizes the current trend of  protectionism against  labour mobility in the
United States and Europe. It points out the role of migration in relieving the strain of
population aging and in contributing to other long-term gains, such as higher growth
and productivity, as already highlighted in chapter 4 of the WEO of October 2016. 
18 Chapter 4 also makes a critique of protectionist policies regarding the mobility of goods
and  services.  It  stresses  that  measures  to  restrict  trade  and  to  benefit  politically-
favoured  sectors  of  the  economy  will  ultimately  harm  productivity  growth.  In  the
analysis of the process whereby innovative activity and technological knowhow spread
across national borders, it is argued that ‘globalization has intensified the diffusion of
knowledge and technology across borders, helping to spread potential growth among
countries and boost it at the global level’ (p. 174). In other words, international trade
and competition promote global knowledge diffusion and thus provide an important
channel through which all countries can benefit from globalization. Therefore, ‘from a
policy perspective, greater global interconnectedness is thus key to maximizing inward
technology diffusion and boosting economies’ growth potential. But as economists have
long emphasized, assimilating and productively using foreign knowledge often requires
investments  in  domestic  R&D  and  in  human  capital,  which  enhance  absorptive
capacity’ (p. 174). 
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19 Chapter 3,  in  turn,  deals  with a  key issue  for  the  heterodox approach to  economic
growth, especially for the Kaldorian theory of economic growth and distribution: the
relationship  between  manufacturing  output,  on  the  one  hand,  and  employment,
productivity, economic growth and income distribution, on the other hand. 
20 The  chapter  begins  by  stating  that  the  share  of  manufacturing  jobs  in  overall
employment is declining, a trend that has become ‘a concern for policymakers and the
broader public alike in both advanced economies and some developing economies’ due
to  ‘the  widely  held  belief  that  manufacturing  plays  a  unique  role  as  a  catalyst  for
productivity growth and income convergence and a source of well-paid jobs for less-
skilled  workers’  (p. 147).  Another  worry  is  that  currently  poor  countries  may  be
trapped far from the global income frontier if they never pass through a developmental
stage of substantial manufacturing employment.
21 Such  believes  and  worries  are  grounded  in  many  mainstream  studies  cited  in  the
chapter. For instance, according to Baumol (1967), there is historical evidence that the
growth of productivity and income tends to slow once factors of production begin to
shift from manufacturing to services (Baumol, 1967; Imbs, 2016). Rodrik (2016) points
out that such a phenomenon could be especially unsettling for developing economies,
where employment shares are shifting from agriculture directly to services, as skipping
a traditional industrialization phase could hinder the convergence process (i.e., their
ability to narrow income gaps vis-à-vis advanced economies).
22 Against that backdrop, the aim of the chapter is to provide new evidence of the role of
manufacturing in the dynamics of output per worker and in the level and distribution
of labour earnings. It has two main findings. 
23 Firstly, there is evidence that output has outpaced employment in the manufacturing
sector  in  most  countries  since  the  early  1970s,  reflecting  comparatively  fast
productivity growth in the sector. However, the same pattern has not held at the global
level. The broadly parallel movement of global manufacturing output and employment
shares  reflects  a  change  in  the  country  composition  of  global  manufacturing
employment in favour of developing economies, where output per worker tends to be
lower.
24 Secondly,  the rise in service share of  employment simultaneously to the decline or
stabilisation in  the manufacturing share does  not  necessarily  hinder  economy-wide
productivity  growth.  Such a  rise  has  contributed positively  to  that  growth in most
developing economies. Indeed, some service industries have higher productivity levels
and  growth  rates  than  manufacturing  overall.  Moreover,  just  as  in  manufacturing,
productivity  levels  in  services  tend  to  converge  to  the  global  frontier  (i.e.,  to  the
productivity level in the most productive countries). And, although labour earnings in
manufacturing are somewhat higher and more uniformly distributed than in services,
the main driver of the rise in labour income inequality in advanced economies since the
1980s has been an increase in inequality within all sectors.
25 Therefore, as services can offer considerable scope for productivity gains, contributing
to the convergence of income per worker across countries, according to the IMF the
best policy response is not to overrule market forces and subsidize manufacturing. The
goal of supporting equitable growth ‘would be better served by policy efforts to raise
productivity  across  all  sectors  and  make  the  gains  from  higher  productivity  more
inclusive.  Facilitating  the  reallocation  of  labor  to  productively  dynamic  sectors,
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including by removing barriers to entry and trade in the service sector and supporting
the reskilling of workers affected by structural change, is crucial to raise productivity
and combat inequality’ (p. 147).
26 Hence,  chapter 4  broaches  a  very  important  issue  that  is  the  importance  of
manufacturing to a country’s economic growth, productivity and income distribution.
However, the chapter does not highlight Kaldor’s seminal contribution, quoting that
author only once. The analysis is based on non-neoclassical mainstream economists,
such as Baumol (1967) and Rodrik (2016), who have included the issue in the analysis of
economic growth, as had occurred with other heterodox subjects.
27 Kaldor  (1967)  formulates  three  propositions  to  explain  the  importance  of
manufacturing  to  GDP  growth  (McCombie  &  Thirlwall,  1994).  The  first  proposition
affirms that the faster the rate of growth of manufacturing output, the faster the rate
of  growth  of  labour  productivity  in  manufacturing,  due  to  static  and  dynamic
economies of  scale or increasing returns to scale.  This proposition is  known in the
literature  as  Verdoorn’s  Law.  The  second  proposition  affirms  that  there  is  a  strong
positive correlation between the manufacturing sector’s growth rate and productivity
growth outside the manufacturing sector, because the manufacturing sector produces
goods  that  can  be  used  by  other  sectors,  thereby  providing  the  possibility  for
improving their productivity. Finally, the last proposition asserts that the faster the
rate of growth of the manufacturing sector, the faster the rate of GDP growth (Baltar,
2013).
28 Kaldor’s (1967) propositions are still valid and important; however, to understand the
role of manufacturing, it is crucial to consider the transformations that took place in
global production, making the role of manufacturing more complex than before. The
global  strategies  of  transnational  companies,  with  intense  de-verticalization,
fragmentation of activities, and a strong international outsourcing trend, affect each
country’s possibilities for industrial development (Hiratuka & Sarti, 2017). This change
created the possibility for developing countries to incorporate industrial activities in
their  production  through  their  participation  in  different  stages  of  the  value  chain
(Baldwin, 2011). Yet, the incorporation of manufacturing activities is not necessarily
related to higher possibilities of economic growth and development.
29 According  to  Hiratuka  and  Sarti  (2017),  large  firms  outsourced  non-core  business
activities, including manufacturing activities, and at the same time they strengthened
their  intangible  assets  and  increased  their  control  over  technology  standards.  The
consequence has been stronger power of transnational companies and the value added
created along the global value chain was concentrated mainly in developed countries
(Chesnais, 1996; Hiratuka & Sarti,  2017). This means that the possibilities for higher
economic growth and development are related to the type of activities each country is
able to produce and the value added they create. These activities can be manufacturing
activities, services or even agricultural activities. 
30 Moreover,  the  differentiation  between  manufacturing  goods  and  services  is  more
complex than before. According to Fornari et  al. (2017),  businesses have transferred  
many activities that used to belong to the manufacturing sector, such as accounting,
advertising, food, etc., to suppliers to reduce costs. (encore, je suppose qu’il s’agit des
entreprises qui ont fait ce transfert, c’est un peu vague) Then, it is necessary to qualify
the  discussion and better  evaluate  how services  are  related  to  industrial  activities,
because this relationship might have changed, impacting a country’s economic growth
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differently. Along the same lines, Arbache (2015) emphasizes that, nowadays, goods and
services  are  related  in  a  way  that  makes  it  impossible  to  characterize  them  as  a
traditional manufactured good or as a conventional service. In the words of Fontagné
and Harrison (2017): ‘recent databases on trade in value added show that goods trade
cannot  easily  be  distinguished  from  services  trade,  and  the  more  so  for  advanced
economies’  (p. 5).  In  this  sense,  to  analyse  the  importance  of  manufacturing  and
services to a country’s economic activity became more complex just as manufactured
goods and services are becoming more interrelated. 
31 Thus, the types of goods and services a country can produce is crucial to its economic
growth  prospects.  According  to  the  Neo-Schumpeterian literature,  the production  of
products  that  create  higher  possibilities  for  economic  growth  are  those  with
technological content. Accordingly, the technological trajectories of different countries
condition  their  possibilities  of  economic  growth  and  development  (Dosi,  1982).  A
country  can enjoy  a  virtuous  circle  of  economic  growth if  this  economy is  able  to
incorporate  new products  and processes  of  production  that  are  close  to  the  world
technological frontier (Dosi, Tyson & Zisman, 1989; Dosi, Pavitt & Soete, 1990). In this
sense, the possibilities for economic growth are related to a country’s possibility to
produce products in high demanded internationally, and the production of these goods
are close to the world technological frontier.
32 Another important issue related to a country’s productive structure and its possibilities
for  economic  growth  is  the  relationship  between  productive  structure  and  the
country’s income inequality. Hartmann et al. (2017) stress that, ‘the mix of products
that an economy makes constrains the occupational choices, learning opportunities,
and  bargaining  power  of  its  workers  and  unions’  (p. 75),  therefore  it  has  a  very
important  role  on  the  country’s  income  distribution.  According  to  the  authors,
technological  catch-up  and  industrialization  in  many  countries  enabled  these
economies to create new jobs and learning opportunities for their workers, improving
their income distribution; at the same time, the economies that passed through a de-
industrialization  and  de-unionization  process  presented  higher  levels  of  income
inequality.
33 In short, the Kaldorian and Neo-Schumpeterian literature emphasizes the importance of
the  type  of  activities  and  the  specialization  pattern  of  each  country  for  their
possibilities of economic growth, productivity and value added creation. Changes in the
specialization pattern and in the potential economic growth may require government
interference in the competitive process through a development strategy that includes
industrial, technological, and trade policies. 
34 This discussion questions the position highlighted in the WEO report on the importance
of  trade  liberalization.  On the  contrary,  this  literature  emphasizes  the  necessity  to
create activities that generate value added and, for that, the government might have to
intervene  in  economic  activity  and  in  the  country’s  international  trade.  Moreover,
economies  with  a  more  diversified  and  integrated  productive  structure  may  have
higher  income  levels  and  lower  income  inequality,  while  having  higher  economic
growth potentialities. The possibilities of higher economic growth are fundamental to
improving the country’s income distribution, but they are not sufficient. Apart from
that, state intervention is also crucial to the creation of the necessary institutions and
policies in favour of a more equal distribution. 
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35 Hence,  in  the  WEO  of  April 2018,  the  IMF  addresses  another  issue  that  is  key  to
heterodoxy: the role of manufacturing in economic growth, employment, productivity
and income distribution. As usual, the IMF embraced the heterodox perspective only
partially. Yet, in this case, the linguistic form used—this publication conveys the IMF’s
official  position—has  had  an  important  influence  on  the  analysis  and  the  policy
recommendations of the analytical chapters.
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NOTES
1. We  adopt  the  concepts  of  mainstream,  orthodoxy  and  heterodoxy  proposed  by
Colander,  Holt  and  Rosser  (2004),  according  to  which  mainstream  economics  is  a
sociologically  defined  category, consisisting  of  the  ideas  held  by  the  elite  of  the
profession,  i.e.,  those  individuals  who  are  dominant  in  the  leading  academic
institutions, organizations, and journals at any given time, especially the top graduate
schools.  It  represents a broader and more eclectic  approach to economics than the
orthodoxy of the profession that is an intellectual defined category, referring to the
most recent dominant “school of thought”, currently “neoclassical economics”. Finally,
the term “heterodoxy” has both an intellectual and a sociological aspect. Heterodox
schilars do not subscribe to the orthodox school of thought and are highly unlikely to
get  funding  through  normal  channels.  Moreover,  even  when  they  share  with
mainstream  economists  similar  views  about  the  limitations  of  the  orthodoxy,  they
refuse  to  work  within  the  of  mainstream  framework  because  either  nature  of  the
modelling process or the assumptions made.
2. For a critical assessment of the new IMF approach on capital controls, see Fritz and Prates
(2014) and Gallagher (2012).
3. Longuet and Marques Pereira (2019) analyse this paper on the basis of the approach called
political economy of discourse.
4. Besides  the  WEO,  the  IMF’s  other  flagship  report  is  the  Global  Financial  Stability  report,
published twice a year (April and October).
5. On the neoclassical growth theories, see Jones (1998).
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ABSTRACTS
The paper presents a critical review of the World Economic Outlook, the flagship report of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), launched in April 2018. After summarizing the global outlook
depicted in chapter 1, we focus on the three analytical chapters that dig into the determinants of
long-term economic growth. Although the report recognizes the role of manufacturing in the
dynamics  of  productivity,  employment  and  income  distribution  stressed  by  the  heterodox
growth theory, it  concludes that services can offer considerable scope for productivity gains,
contributing to the convergence of income per worker across countries. In face of this diagnostic,
the report argues that neither subsidize manufacturing nor step back on trade liberalization are
the best policies responses to support equitable growth. Hence, once more, the IMF embraced the
heterodox perspective only partially. 
Cet  article  présente  un examen critique de l’édition d’avril 2018 du rapport  « Perspective  de
l’économie  mondiale » du  Fonds  monétaire  international  (FMI).  Après  un  résumé  des
perspectives mondiales décrites dans le chapitre 1, nous nous concentrons sur les trois chapitres
analytiques qui examinent les déterminants de la croissance économique à long terme. Bien que
le rapport reconnaisse le rôle du secteur manufacturier dans la dynamique de la productivité, de
l’emploi et de la distribution des revenus tel que la théorie hétérodoxe de la croissance, il conclut
que les services peuvent offrir des possibilités considérables de gains de productivité, tout en
contribuant à la convergence du revenu par travailleur entre les pays. Face à ce diagnostic, le
rapport soutient que les  subventions accordées à  l’industrie  manufacturière et  le  recul  de la
libéralisation du commerce ne sont pas les  meilleures réponses politiques pour soutenir  une
croissance équitable. Dès lors, et une fois de plus, le FMI n’aura-t-il adopté que partiellement la
perspective hétérodoxe. 
INDEX
Keywords: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Growth Theory, multilateral
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